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is not subject to the arbitrary election of the landlord but
may terminate the relationship and vacate with only 30
days statutory notice.28
EDWARD J. FisHER III
Holder Of A Conditional Sales Contract As An
"Encumbrancer" Within The Meaning
Of Recording Statutes
Automobile Accep. Corp. v. Universal Corp.'
On July 5, 1955, Suburban Nash, Inc. sold by contract
of conditional sale an automobile to Thomas, and he on
that date took possession of the auto. On the same day
Suburban Nash assigned the contract to appellee, Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corporation. The following day, Suburban
Nash induced Thomas to execute a second conditional sales
contract covering the same auto. This contract, together
with a duplicate title to the auto obtained fraudulently
from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, was immedi-
ately assigned to appellant, Automobile Acceptance Cor-
poration. Neither contract was recorded until seven months
later when Suburban Nash was in financial difficulties.
Then, Auto Acceptance recorded its contract first, and
C.I.T. recorded three days later.
C.I.T. brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment
or decree establishing the superiority of its claim over that
of Auto Acceptance.
The Circuit Court found that Section 2 of Article 8 of
The Code of 19512 relating to assignments of accounts re-
ceivable or contracts with or without notification to the
debtor of the assignment was controlling, and therefore
gave a decree for C.I.T. The Court of Appeals reversed
by a 3-2 decision. The majority of the Court of Appeals
rejected the assignment statute as controlling, but found
"Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) §731; Darling Shops v. Balto.
Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948) Following ex-
tended negotiations the tenancy may be determined by the measuring period
of the rent. In Schilling v. Klein, 41 Ill. App. 209 (1921) the tenant held
over, paid rent, and negotiated for a new lease. Terms were never agreed
upon and the Court held 'that the negotiations were inconsistent with the
previous lease and since the tenant was in possession paying a monthly
rent, that in itself created a month to month tenancy.
1216 Md. 344, 139 A. 2d 683 (1958).
'Now 1 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 8, §1.
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rather that Section 74 of Article 21 of the Code of 1951'
pertaining to recording of conditional sales contracts, was
applicable. Since the holder of the second contract re-
corded -first, he should prevail. In order to do this the
majority had to find that the holder of a conditional con-
tract of sale was an incumbrancer within the meaning of
the recording statute.
The dissent did not agree that the holder of a condi-
tional sales contract was an incumbrancer within the mean-
ing of the statute, and therefore would not apply it.
The majority pointed out that the act concerning assign-
ments of accounts receivable4 was apparently passed to
cover a situation such as that in Corn Exchange Bank v.
Klauder.6 There, an assignment made under the non-
notification plan was set aside as preferential under the
bankruptcy act.6 The important date under the bankruptcy
act was the time when a transfer became perfected as
against a bona fide purchaser or a creditor. In states, such
as Pennsylvania, where the Klauder case arose, and in
Maryland, it was necessary to give the debtor notice of
the assignment to perfect it. Therefore, under a non-
notification plan of assignment of accounts receivable, the
assignee would never perfect his claim prior to the bank-
ruptcy of the assignor.7
8 Now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, §66.
'Supra, n. 2. In pertinent part:
"All written assignments, and all written assignments In the nature
of a pledge, of accounts receivable and amounts due or to become due
on open accounts or contracts, except In cases where notice to the
debtor of such assignment is specifically required by any policy of
insurance or a statute then in effect, shall be valid and legal and shall
pass the title of such accounts receivable and amounts due or to be-
come due on open accounts or contracts to the assignee thereof, and
shall take effect according to the terms of the assignment, without the
necessity of notice to the debtor, and the transfer of the title shall
take effect and be valid and enforcible against all persons as of the
date thereof; . .. ."
5318 U.S. 434, 144 A.L.R. 1189 (1943).
60 (a), (b) as amended June 22, 1938; 11 U.S.C.A. (1943) §96 (a), (b).
As authority that in Maryland to protect one's assignment against a
subsequent assignee, the assignee must have first given notice to the debtor
the Court cites Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 72 A. 407 (1909). Compare
this situation with that of the claim of a prior assignee against that of a
subsequent attaching creditor. See McDowell, Pyle & Co. v. Hopfield, 148
Md. 84, 128 A. 742, 52 A.L.R. 105 (1925) ; and also Seymour v. Finance &
Guaranty Co., 155 Md. 514, 531, 142 A. 710 (1928). These cases illustrate
that except under the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938
any assignee has a right superior to that of a general creditor. For a
discussion of these cases see Page, Latent Equities in Maryland, 1 Md. L.
Rev. 1, 19-25 (1936).
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Within two months after the Klauder case the Maryland
General Assembly passed the statute doing away with the
requirement of notice to perfect an assignment of accounts
receivable or of money due under a contract.' This section
was meant "to validate assignments of accounts receivable
against third parties without notification of the debtor."9
It was not until 1955 that this statute was first cited
in a case."° The Court of Appeals of Maryland said that
probably the statute was meant to change the law only
to the extent of dispensing with notice as a requirement
for "'perfecting'" claims against a subsequent trustee in
bankruptcy of the assignor. It held that "notice may still
be a factor in determining priorities as between the various
parties or claimants . . . ."I This language severely limits
the scope of the statute and would seem to justify the
court's refusal in the present case to hold the assignment
statute controlling.12
After their discussion and a finding that the assignment
of accounts receivable act was not controlling, the majority
turned its attention to the recording statute.3 The recog-
nized purpose of this statute was to protect against secret
liens created by retention of title after delivery of posses-
sion.'4 In Maryland, prior to the first recording statute,
passed in 1916, conditional sales contracts were held valid
against creditors as well as between the parties; but they
were held not valid against bona fide purchasers for value
8 Supra, n. 2. See also Arnold, The 1950 Amendment to the Preference
Section of the Bankruptcy Act and Maryland Law, 14 Md. L. Rev. 311
(1954).
9Arnold, op. cit. ibid., 314.
10 Md. Coop. Milk Producers v. Bell, 206 Md. 168, 110 A. 2d 661 (1955).
"Ibid., 177.
"To date there are no other reported cases where this statute has been
cited.
I2 MD. CODI (1957) Art. 21, §66:
"Every ... contract for the sale of goods and chattels, . . . wherein
the title thereto, or a lien thereon, Is reserved until the same be paid
in whole or in part, or the transfer of title is made to depend upon
any condition therein expressed and possession is to be delivered to
the vendee, shall in respect to such reservation and condition, be void
as to subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, incumbrancers . . . until
such ... contract be in writing, signed by the vendee and be recorded
... . Such recording shall be sufficient to give actual or constructive
notice to such parties when a memorandum of the paper writing signed
by the vendee or vendees, setting forth the date thereof, the amount
due thereon, when and how payable and a 'brief description of the
goods and chattels therein mentioned shall have been recorded with
the clerk aforesaid. .... I
'A Tatelbaum v. Nat'l. Store Etc. Co., 196 Md. 599, 606, 78 A. 2d 228 (1951).
This case contains an excellent discussion of the history of the conditional
sales recording statute.
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without notice.'5 The 1916 act attempted to protect third
persons without notice from contracts of conditional sales
that were not recorded. 6 This broad language offered pro-
tection to anyone who acted without notice and would be
injured by enforcement of the conditional sales contract. 7
In 1949 the legislature amended the act so as to strike out
the phrase "third persons without notice" and substitute
certain designated classes.'"
In 1954 the Court of Appeals was asked to include among
those protected by the, statute, creditors in a case involving
a general assignment for benefit of creditors. 9 It was argued
that this should be done since receivers were included
within the statute and trustees under a general assign-
ment, being very similar, should also be included. The
court, however, noted the differences between the two, and
refused to extend coverage to one whom the legislature
chose not to cover. The Court again chose not to allow re-
cording to be a bar to recovery in Mohr v. Sands, 0 where
it was held that recording was not sufficient to give con-
structive notice when possession of the chattel had not
passed from the vendor to the vendee.
Where the parties have brought themselves properly
within the, terms of the statute the reservation of title by
the conditional vendor has been upheld.2 In the present
case the Court considered the important question to be
the effect of the recording statute on the rights of the con-
1Praeger v. Implement Co., 122 Md. 303, 89 A. 501 (1914); Hall v.
Hinks, 21 Md. 406 (1864) ; Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299, 11 A. 848 (1888);
Tatlebaum v. Pantex Mfg. Corp., 204 Md. 360, 104 A. 2d 813 (1954).
11 MD. LAWS 1916, ch. 355.
7 Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 43-44, 118 A. 198 (1922).
"
8 MD. LAWS 1949, ch. 430:
. . as to subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, incumbrancers, land-
lords with liens, pledgees, receivers, and creditors who acquired a lien
by Judicial proceedings on such goods and chattels without notice ... 
Tatelbaum v. Pantex Mfg. Corp., 8upra, n. 15.
213 Md. 206, 131 A. 2d 732 (1957), noted in 19 Md. L. Rev. 78 (1959).
This case involved virtually the same parties as those involved in .the case
presently under discussion, and also was brought about by the fraudulent
dealings of the Suburban Nash Company. The Company sold an auto to
Mrs. Mohr, by contract of conditional sale, which was assigned to Universal
C.I.T. and was duly recorded. Mrs. Mohr did not take the auto herself,
but allowed her ex-husband, a salesman for Suburban Nash, to keep it.
The auto was used as a demonstrator, and was eventually sold to Sands,
also by conditional sales contract. This contract was assigned to Auto
Acceptance Corp. and it too was properly recorded. After the bankruptcy
of Suburban Nash, Mrs. Mohr and C.I.T. brought suit to establish the
superiority of their respective claims.
21 Gunby v. Motor Truck Corp., 156 Md. 19, 142 A. 596 (1928) ; Goldenberg
v. Finance & Credit Co., 150 Md. 298, 133 A. 59 (1926) ; Finance Etc. Co.
v. Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 125 A. 585 (1924).
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ditional vendor and pointed out that the purpose of re-
cording is to protect against secret liens.22
Thus the principal issue in this case was whether the
appellant fell within the protected classes. No longer does
the recording statute protect the broad class of "third per-
sons without notice" as did the old statutes. Under the 1949
amendment only certain designated classes were to be pro-
tected, and the obvious intent of that statute was to limit
the class. 23 The majority of the Court found that the holder
of a conditional sales contract held a lien and therefore
was an incumbrancer, and protected under the statute. The
minority dissented on this point. They argued that the
holder of a conditional sales contract holds title, and as
such could not hold a lien.
It is true that from the very terms of a conditional con-
tract of sale the vendor retains legal title. But that title
is kept only for the purpose of securing the, payment of the
purchase price. "It could have no other purpose ... It
is kept for purposes of security.25 If such is the case, then
it appears that a conditional vendor does retain a lien, and
many states have so held.2"
A federal case, arising in Maryland, said that the seller
retains an interest, referred to as a "security title", but
the buyer gets the beneficial title.27 The majority cites
no case as primary authority for their finding that the
conditional vendor is an incumbrancer under Maryland law.
Rather, the majority opinion goes about the problem by
way of analogy. It cites the Motor Vehicle statut&1 and
the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act,29 with the
intimations contained therein that the holder of a legal
title may have a lien. The majority also notes that they
believe that their finding that a conditional vendor has a
lien is in accord with general business understanding. This
2 Supra, n. 1, 357.
" The dissent points out in their opinion that the 1949 amendment was
brought about at the instance of the large credit companies, supra, n. 1,
dis. op. 360, 362.
3 JoNs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALS (6th ed. 1933) 312.
Op. cit. ibid., §1242.
Op. cit. supra, n. 24, §1242 and cases cited. It should be noted that in
this same section it is said that other states hold that more than a lien
is retained. Just how much more Is not clear. No Maryland cases are
cited one way or the other. The decision of the majority in the present
case would seem to put Maryland with those states that hold to the lien
theory.
In re Imperial Brewing Co., 127 F. 2d 766, 769 (4th Cir. 1942).
6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 .
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 83, §§128-153.
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is probably true and would be a strong justification for
the court's deciding as it did.
In support of their argument the minority cited inter
alia the case of Westinghouse v. State Tax Comm. ° West-
inghouse claimed that the government had title to goods
manufactured by them for the government and so the
goods were immune from state taxation. The Court, how-
ever, said Westinghouse had legal title and so the goods
were taxable. At this point the Court said that one could
not have a lien on goods to which they held title.1 The
Court, in the Westinghouse case, distinguished that case
from an earlier one where a naked legal title was not taxed
because the equitable title was in the Federal government. 2
It would seem then that the statement of the Court in the
Westinghouse case was not meant to apply to naked legal
titles. The dissent also cited other cases that have held in
various situations that the conditional vendor holds title
and that the conditional vendee had only a right to posses-
sion of the goods with a right to gain title on fulfillment of
the conditions of the contract.33
Probably the majority reached a better decision, at
least from the standpoint of public policy. If the assign-
ment statute had been held controlling, an assignee could
never be sure of protecting himself. At times some hard-
ship may be caused as a result of enforcement of the record-
ing statute, but protection may be had by timely recorda-
tion. By failing to record a creditor subjects himself to
a possibility of loss.3 4
S. LEONAiR ROTTMAN
-206 Md. 392, 111 A. 2d 661 (1955).
Ibid., 402.
2 Hopkins Univ. v. County Commrs., 185 Md. 614, 620, 45 A. 2d 747 (1946).
8 In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F. 2d 326, 328 (2nd Cir. 1935), cert. den. 296
U.S. 622 (1935), where a distinction was made between a conditional
vendor and a mortgagee. Dissenting, Judge Learned Hand called the dis-
tinction a barren one; dis. op. 328. Stern Co. of Washington v. Rosenberg,
89 F. 2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; court refused ,to allow a landlord to attach
goods sold to tenant by conditional sales contract. See also State Bank v.
Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177 P. 340, 3 A.L.R. 235 (1918), where the fact
situation is somewhat similar to the present case. The Court heid that the
assignment by the conditional vendor of his contract divested him of all
he had, and a subsequent sale by him of the same chattel transferred
nothing to the second vendee.
" See Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., 104 F. 2d 837, 841 (4th
Cir. 1939).
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